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2018 Erwin N. Griswold Lecture Before 
the American College of Tax Counsel:  
Tax Policy Elegy
MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR.*
Prologue
I sincerely thank the Board of Regents of the American College of Tax 
Counsel for inviting me to give this lecture. It is a great honor to be asked 
to speak to an audience of the country’s foremost tax lawyers. Prior speakers 
have been giants of the Tax Bar, many of whom have held important govern-
ment positions, have served as Chair of the Tax Section, or were professors at 
the nation’s most prestigious law schools. I am none of these. After only five 
years in private practice in New Hampshire, I spent the next 38 years before 
my retirement on the faculty of a couple of state university law schools, with 
only a year of government service as a Professor-in Residence in the Office of 
Chief Counsel in the mid-1980s.
It is customary at this event to pay homage to and talk about the speaker’s 
connection to Erwin Griswold. However, my contact with Dean Griswold 
was virtually non-existent, being limited to sitting in the audience as a young 
tax lawyer in the mid- to late-1970s at the semi-annual New England Tax 
Institute, where Dean Griswold presided.
Those of you of my vintage might recall how different the tax system was in 
the mid-1970s. The corporate tax rate was 48 percent, the highest individual 
marginal rate was 70 percent. Capital gains generally were taxed at half the 
ordinary rate, but the top rate could reach 49 percent, and earned income was 
subject to a maximum rate of 50 percent.1 Most businesses other than real 
estate, some natural resources, and professional practices were conducted in 
C corporation form. And the estate tax kicked-in at $60,000, with a maxi-
mum marital deduction of one-half.
Oh my, how the tax world has changed!
* James J. Freeland Eminent Scholar in Taxation and Professor Emeritus, Fredric G. Levin
College of Law, University of Florida.
1 In 1977 and 1978, the maximum tax rate on capital gains reached 39.875% under the 
minimum tax and 49.875% under an interaction with the maximum tax. See Leonard Bur-
man & Deborah Kobes, Preferential Capital Gains Tax Rates, 102 Tax Notes (TA) 411 (Jan. 
19, 2004); see generally Gregg A. Esenwein, Cong. Research Serv., 98-473, Individual 
Capital Gains Income: Legislative History (2007).
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I. Introduction
In Hillbilly Elegy, J.D. Vance laments the plight of the Appalachian peo-
ple and their failure to see their own contributions to that plight, blaming 
others for drug and alcohol addition, under-education, and unemployment. 
Vance’s observations that the Appalachian people fail to appreciate their own 
contributions to their plight is paralleled by taxpayers, tax professionals, and 
politicians’ lamentations over the state of the federal tax system. For over four 
decades there have been unrelenting calls to make the tax code “fair, simple, 
and efficient.” But despite nine major tax acts between 1969 and 2003,2 along 
with many less extensive tax acts, the refrain for a “fair, simple, and efficient” 
tax code has continued to be heard. This continuing plea is not surprising, 
because over the decades the tax system has evolved to ask the highest income 
earners to pay less in taxes, become ever more complex, and eschewed “effi-
ciency” in favor of the allowance of an ever-increasing number of tax prefer-
ences. Tax act after tax act failed to produce a fair, simple, and efficient tax 
code. The recently enacted Tax Cuts and Jobs Act3 is simply another failure to 
enact tax reform that provides a fair, simple, and efficient tax code.
The call for a “fair, simple, and efficient” tax code has become a mere trope. 
So, what is “tax reform”? True “tax reform” entails revising the tax code 
better to meet normative tax policy criteria. Serious policy analysis of tax 
reform proposals requires an analytical examination of fairness, simplicity, 
and efficiency. Furthermore, there are some realities that we must recognize.
First, the tax system should adequately fund the government. In 2018, in 
light of persistent deficits, the ever-growing ratio of national debt to GDP, 
and the aging of the population, with the attendant increased spending on 
Social Security and Medicare, this criterion calls for increased taxes, not lower 
2 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 26 U.S.C.); Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, 
Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); 
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); Tax Reform of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 
Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); Omnibus Budget Recon-
ciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–508, 104 Stat. 1388 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 26 U.S.C.); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 
107 Stat. 312 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); Economic Growth Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub L. No. 107–16, 115 Stat. 38 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. 
L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
3 Act of Dec. 22, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054. The legislation included the
short title “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act,” but the name was stricken by the Senate Parliamentarian 
immediately prior to the Senate’s passage of the final bill.
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taxes.4 Notwithstanding the beliefs of many taxpayers, politicians, and tax 
professionals, the United States is not a high tax country. To the contrary, it is 
a low tax country. Among the advanced economies in the OECD, the United 
States ranks near the bottom in the percentage of GDP collected in taxes, 
taking into account not just federal taxes, but all taxes imposed at all levels.5 
Second, the significant income and wealth inequality in the United States6 
must be taken into account in structuring both the income tax base and 
rates, as well as the estate tax. This distribution is particularly relevant when 
considering rate and base issues that provide tax relief to income from capital 
relative to income from wages, since capital income is even more highly con-
centrated at the top of the income pyramid than total income.7 
Third, we need to recognize how path dependency often constrains tax 
reform. I will focus on a few path dependencies that I believe led to wrong 
turns and missed opportunities in the 2017 tax legislation.
4 A fair argument can be made that even the middle class in the United States does not need 
tax relief. See Kirk J. Stark & Eric M. Zolt, Opinion, We Don’t Need Tax Cuts for the Middle 
Class, Wash. Post, Oct. 18, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/we-dont-need-
tax-cuts-for-the-middle-class/2017/10/18/4ce2f378-b37c-11e7-a908-a3470754bbb9_story.
html?utm_term=.72ca41c282a3 (“Data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development reveal that American families with children face substantially lower average 
income-tax rates (in some cases, less than half ) than similar families in other developed coun-
tries. And this is before factoring in consumption taxes, which represent a large share of mid-
dle-class tax burdens in most countries, but not in the United States.”). For the OECD data, 
see Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Taxing Wages—Comparative Tables: Aver-
age Tax Wedge, OECD.Stat, Feb. 20, 2018, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=55129. 
Income taxes as a percentage of AGI do not exceed ten percent until income exceeds $100,000. 
See Martin A. Sullivan, Will Reform Undo Income Tax Regressivity at the High End?, 157 Tax 
Notes (TA) 301 (Oct. 16, 2017).
5 OECD, Revenue Statistics 2016: Tax Revenue Trends in the OECD 4 (2016); 
OECD, Revenue Statistics: 1965–2015 (2015).
6 See Cong. Budget Office, The Distribution of Household Income and Federal 
Taxes, 2013 6 (2016) (“Market income is highly skewed toward households at the top of 
the income distribution (see Figure 3). In 2013, households in the lowest quintile of market 
income earned about $8,300 per household, on average. Households in the middle quintile 
earned about $58,600, and households in the top quintile earned about $259,900. Within the 
top quintile of households, market income is also skewed toward the very top of the distribu-
tion. The 1.2 million households in the top 1 percent of the market income distribution earned 
about $1.6 million per household, on average, which accounted for approximately 17 percent 
of total market income in 2013.”); see also Robert J. Gordon, The Rise and Fall of Ameri-
can Growth 605-20 (2016) (describing increasing income inequality); Thomas Piketty, 
Capital in the Twenty-First Century 347-50 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Harvard Univ. 
Press 2014) (2013) (documenting inequality of wealth in the United States). 
7 See Cong. Budget Office, supra note 6, at 8; Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel 
Zucman, Distributional National Accounts: Methods and Estimates for the United States, Q. J. 
Econ. (forthcoming 2018), https://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/PSZ2017.pdf [hereinafter Piketty 
et al., Distributional National Accounts].
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The first path dependency is that there is an inherent meaning to the con-
cept of a “capital asset,” and that gains realized on the sale of capital assets 
should be taxed at preferential rates.8 
The second path dependency is the persistence in individual income taxa-
tion of the adjusted gross income concept, which sorts deductions into two 
tranches, favoring some with universal deductibility and relegating others to 
the category of “itemized deductions,” which reduce taxable income only if 
their sum total exceeds a specified standard deduction.
The third path dependency is rigidity over many decades of the classifica-
tion of certain personal deductions as tax expenditures.  
The final path dependency is the notion that pass-through taxation of non-
corporate business income, as well as the overlay of a pass-through regime for 
qualifying corporate entities in Subchapter S, is inviolate. 
II. What Does the Phrase “Fair, Simple, and Efficient” Mean?
So what does the phrase “fair, simple, and efficient mean?”
A. Fairness—Horizontal and Vertical Equity
In tax policy analysis, the word “fair” standing alone has no normative
content. From the perspective of traditional tax policy criteria, the extent to 
which the tax system is fair depends on the extent to which it achieves both 
horizontal and vertical equity.
Horizontal equity means that the tax burden on similarly situated taxpay-
ers should be equal. The difficulty in satisfying this criterion lies in determin-
ing similarity. If a dollar is a dollar, then two taxpayers (or households) with 
equal incomes, however derived, should pay equal income taxes. But it is 
more complicated than that, because different people spend their incomes 
differently, and we need to determine whether different spending patterns 
might render individuals with identical incomes to be differently situated.
Vertical equity means that taxpayers with greater income than others should 
pay appropriately greater taxes. Expressed this way, it might be argued that all 
that is required to satisfy vertical equity is proportional tax rates. Historically, 
however, this criterion has been interpreted to call for imposing graduated 
progressive rates, including very high marginal rates on extraordinarily high 
incomes, based on the ability to pay principle, reflecting the diminishing 
marginal utility of money.9 This rate structure was in place from the 1940s 
until the early 1980s.
Since 1981, however, with a few exceptions, the focus has been on reduc-
ing the higher marginal rates and flattening the rate schedule. This focus is 
8 The preference was first introduced in 1921 and has taken various forms over the years.
9 For extensive discussion of the diminishing marginal utility of money, ability to pay, and 
vertical equity, see Martin J. McMahon, Jr., The Matthew Effect and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. 
L. Rev. 993 (2004); Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Alice G. Abreu, Winner-Take-All Markets: Eas-
ing the Case for Progressive Taxation, 4 Fla. Tax Rev. 1 (1998).
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grounded on the assertions that (1) lower taxes on high incomes will lead 
to a surge in investment and productivity, (2) incomes at all levels will rise, 
and (3) the famous Laffer-curve argument that tax cuts pay for themselves 
through significant increases in the GDP. The problem with all three of these 
assertions is that they are they are rejected by far more economists than accept 
them, and none of them have been demonstrated empirically to be true when 
income tax rates have been reduced. To the contrary, the empirical data indi-
cate that all three assertions generally are false.10 Economists generally agree 
that the revenue maximizing top rate can be much higher than it is now.11 
B. Simplicity
What is meant by calls for “simplicity”?12 In reality, the tax system can-
not be simple. For one thing, business and investment transactions, par-
ticularly transactions involving sophisticated financial instruments and 
investment vehicles, are complicated even apart from their tax consequences. 
10 See, e.g., Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Economic Growth in the 
United States: A Tale of Two Countries, Wash. Ctr. for Equitable Growth, Dec. 6, 2016, 
http://equitablegrowth.org/research-analysis/economic-growth-in-the-united-states-a-tale-of-
two-countries [hereinafter Piketty et al., A Tale of Two Countries] (from 1980 to 2014, for 
example, none of the growth in per-adult national income went to the bottom 50%, while 
32% went to the middle class (defined as adults between the median and the 90th percentile), 
68% to the top 10%, and 36% to the top 1%; share of national income earned by the bot-
tom 50% collapsed from 20% in 1980 to 12.5% in 2014. Over the same period, the share of 
incomes going to the top one percent surged from 10.7% in 1980 to 20.2% in 2014); Ogu-
zhan Akgun, David Bartolini & Boris Cournède, The Capacity of Governments to Raise Taxes 
(Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev., Econ. Dep’t, Working Paper No. 1407, 2017), http://
www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/the-capacity-of-governments-to-raise-taxes_6bee2df9-en 
(U.S. tax rate at 167% of average income and progressivity of U.S. are below the revenue 
maximization rate); Sandra Lizarazo, Adrian Peralta-Alva & Damien Puy, Macroeconomic and 
Distributional Effects of Personal Income Tax Reforms: A Heterogenous Agent Model Approach 
for the U.S. 1 (IMF, Working Paper No. 17/192, 2017) (personal income tax cuts “stimulate 
growth but the supply side effects are never large enough to offset the revenue loss from lower 
marginal tax rates.”).
The Laffer curve illustrates that the amount of revenue collected by the government is a 
function of the tax rate. This curve is represented by placing the tax rate on the vertical axis 
and tax revenue on the horizontal axis. The graph assumes that there is a tax rate beyond 
which supply response is so great that tax revenues will fall. “It . . . shows that when tax rates 
are very high, any increase in the tax rate could actually cause tax revenues to fall.” Karl E. 
Case & Ray C. Fair, Principles of Economics 289 (1989). For a more thorough explana-
tion of the Laffer curve theory and a discussion of why it is discredited, see Andre Malabre, 
Lost Prophets: An Insider’s History of Modern Economics 181-82 (Beard Books 2003)
(1993); see also Joel Slemrod & Jon Bakija, Taxing Ourselves: A Citizen’s Guide to the 
Great Debate Over Tax Reform 124 (4th ed. 2008) (Laffer curve theory did not work).
11 See Bruce Bartlett, What Is the Revenue-Maximizing Tax Rate?, 134 Tax Notes (TA) 1013 
(Feb. 20, 2012). Some conclude that it can be well above 50% for taxpayers at the very top of 
the income pyramid. Bartlett, supra; see also Peter Diamond & Emmanuel Saez, The Case for a 
Progressive Tax: From Basic Research to Policy Recommendations, 25 J. Econ. Persp. 165 (2011) 
(suggesting that the maximum rate could be as high as 73%).
12 See Peter E. Boos, Decoding the Code, 156 Tax Notes (TA) 323 (July 17, 2017).
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Furthermore, if we want to tax individuals on their ability to pay, various 
deductions must be taken into account. All that we can ask is that the tax 
system is not unnecessarily unduly complex. 
That means minimizing special rules that are not necessary accurately to 
determine economic income or ability to pay consistent with both horizontal 
and vertical equity principles.
Under the generally accepted Haig-Simons definition, income is the sum 
of (1) the market value of consumption and (2) the change in net worth, 
between two specified points in time.13 Complexity necessary to measure 
economic income under this definition is a necessary evil, while provisions 
designed to mismeasure income—with the exception of the realization 
requirement—generally generate unnecessary complexity. 
Those special rules that mismeasure income or allow tax credits to encour-
age a particular activity—tax expenditures—must be carefully examined to 
determine if they add undue complexity or are better administered through 
the tax system rather than by direct spending.
Virtually all business related tax expenditures, with the possible exception 
of the MACRS depreciation system, create significant complexity. Enormous 
complexity is added by the large number of business-related credits, which 
have increased nearly eight-fold between 1988 and today.14 
It is long past time to pay more attention to the wisdom advanced over fifty 
years ago by Stanley Surrey in his analysis of the systemic problems created 
by introducing spending provisions through tax expenditure preferences in 
the tax code.15 
One final comment on simplicity. An almost never ending succession of 
temporary tax provisions that sunset after a few years, or a decade, unless 
extended, generates enormous unnecessary undue complexity.  
13 Henry C. Simons, Personal Income Taxation: The Definition of Income as a 
Problem of Fiscal Policy 50 (1938).
14 In 1988, there were very few business related tax credits; only five were discussed in one of 
the tax treatises. See Boris I. Bittker & Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Federal Income Taxa-
tion of Individuals ¶¶ 16.1-16.6 (1988). Currently, the most recent edition of that treatise 
discusses 40 additional business tax credits—all of them tax expenditures—that have been 
introduced since, although a few were temporary and have lapsed. See Boris I. Bittker, Mar-
tin J. McMahon, Jr. & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Federal Income Taxation of Individuals 
¶¶ 20.01–20.35 (3d ed. 2018).
15 See Stanley S. Surrey, Asst. Sec’y of the Treas., The U.S. Income Tax System—The Need 
for a Full Accounting, Remarks Before The Money Marketeers (Nov. 15, 1967), in Ann’l 
Rep’t of the Sec’y of the Treas. on the State of the Finances FYE June 30, 1968, at 
322; Stanley S. Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform (1973); Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. 
McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept: Current Developments and Emerging Issues, 20 B.C. L. 
Rev. 225 (1979); Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept and the 
Budget Reform Act of 1974, 17 B.C. Indus. & Comm. L. Rev. 679 (1976); Stanley S. Surrey 
& Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures (1985). 
One notable exception is the earned income credit, which is essentially a version of a nega-
tive income tax or a wage subsidy for low income earners and is generally agreed is more effi-
ciently delivered through the tax system than through other means.
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C.  Efficiency
What do we mean when we ask for an “efficient” tax system? Obviously, we 
want a tax system that collects tax revenue with low transaction costs to both 
the fisc and to taxpayers. From the government’s side, by this measure we have 
one of the most efficient tax systems in the world. However, while many tax-
payers do not incur significant transaction costs or spend inordinate amounts 
of time in fulfilling their obligation to pay taxes, for many other taxpayers 
complexity results in significant transaction costs and time expenditure.
The greatest inefficiency in the form of transaction costs is encountered by 
business taxpayers, particularly due to tax expenditure preferences and plan-
ning options, such as choice of entity issues, and the myriad of express or 
implicit options for structuring business transactions to produce different tax 
results for transactions that apart from taxes are substantially similar. Thus, 
it often is taxpayer-friendly complexity that increases taxpayer transaction 
costs, rather than ascertaining compliance with the revenue raising provisions 
of the Code.
But overwhelmingly, “efficiency” means economic efficiency. That requires 
structuring the tax system to minimize interference with economic decision-
making. To the greatest extent possible, the tax law should be neutral, tax-
ing every investment made by a particular taxpayer identically and taxing all 
industries identically. In this regard, the Internal Revenue Code is an abject 
failure. It is replete with special provisions—tax expenditures—favoring vari-
ous investments by various industries to one extent or another. 
Even MACRS is inefficient in this respect. To be neutral, depreciation must 
be based on actual economic depreciation. Prior to 1981, depreciation nomi-
nally approximated economic depreciation. But that was abandoned with the 
“simplification” and “economic growth” cost recovery rules of ACRS, and 
now MACRS. The result is widely disparate effective tax rates between differ-
ent industries, which distort investment decisions.16
III.  Efficiency versus Equity
Some analysts appear to treat avoiding interference with the efficiency 
of the market economy as the paramount tax policy goal.17 These analysts 
emphasize minimizing distortions with respect to deployment of capital, 
which leads them to support preferential treatment of income from capital. 
16 See Jane G. Gravelle, The Economic Effects of Taxing Capital Income (1994).
17 See Michael Boskin, Taxation, Savings, and the Rate of Interest, 86 J. Pol. Econ. 3, 18-25 
(1978); David F. Bradford, The Economics of Tax Policy Toward Savings, in The Government 
and Capital Formation 11, 20-28 (George von Furstenberg ed. 1980); Martin Feldstein, The 
Welfare Cost of Capital Income Taxation, 86 J. Pol. Econ. 29 (1978). 
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This focus conflicts with equitable principles because capital income is 
highly concentrated at the very top of the income pyramid,18 and capital 
income represents a very high percentage of the income of taxpayers at the 
top of the pyramid.19 In 2016, 75 percent of the tax benefit of the preferential 
rates for capital income went to taxpayers with incomes over $1 million.20 
Roughly one-half of all capital gains are realized by the top one-tenth of one 
percent of taxpayers.21
As Martin Sullivan of Tax Analysts has noted, “[T]he superrich actually pay 
tax at a lower effective rate than the regular rich.”22 Thus, the principal effect 
of the preferential rate appears to be the addition of a regressive feature that 
adds significant complexity to the income tax.23 
Tax preferences for capital income violate the tax policy criteria of horizon-
tal and vertical equity. These criteria call for elimination of the preferential 
rates for capital gains, as well as the section 1014 tax-free basis step-up at 
death, which completely eliminates any tax on unrealized gains with respect 
to assets held until death.
However, the advocates of the efficiency argument theorize that as long 
as the size of the pie increases, even if all of the increase initially is realized 
by those at the top of the income pyramid, inevitably some portion of that 
increase will “trickle down” to those lower in the income pyramid. Almost 40 
years of economic data, going back to the 1981 top-end tax cuts tell us that 
18 See Cong. Budget Office & Joint Committee on Taxation, The Distribution of 
Asset Holdings and Capital Gains (2016); Cong. Budget Office, supra note 6, at 8; 
Leonard E. Burman & Peter D. Rickoy, Capital Gains and the People Who Realize Them, 50 
Nat’l Tax J. 432 (1997); Leonard E. Burman & Deborah I. Kodes, Composition of Income 
Reported on Tax Returns, 101 Tax Notes (TA) 783 (Nov. 10, 2003); Gregg A. Esenwein 
& Jane G. Gravelle, Cong. Research Serv., RL31562, An Analysis of the Tax Treat-
ments of Capital Losses 7-8 (2002); Jane G. Gravelle, Effects of Dividend Relief on Economic 
Growth, the Stock Market, and Corporate Tax Preferences, 56 Nat’l Tax J. 653, 654 (2003); 
The Tax Break-Down: Preferential Rates on Capital Gains, Comm. for a Responsible Fed. 
Budget: The Tax Break-Down, Aug. 27, 2013, http://www.crfb.org/blogs/tax-break-down-
preferential-rates-capital-gains.
19 Derek Thompson, The Rise (and Rise and Rise) of the 0.01 Percent in America, The Atlan-
tic, Feb. 13, 2014, https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/02/the-rise-and-rise-
and-rise-of-the-001-percent-in-america/283793/. 
20 What is the Effect of a Lower Tax Rate for Capital Gains?, Capital Gains and Dividends, 
Tax Pol’y Ctr. Briefing Book (2016), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-
effect-lower-tax-rate-capital-gains (11% went to taxpayers with income under $200,000 and 
4.2% of the benefit went to taxpayers with income under $100,000).
21 The Tax Break-Down: Preferential Rates on Capital Gains, supra note 18.
22 Martin A. Sullivan, Will Reform Undo Income Tax Regressivity at the High End?, 157 Tax 
Notes (TA) 301 (2017).
23 As Leonard Burman at the Tax Policy Center has pointed out, the preferential rate “(1) 
distort[s] work and investment decisions into activities that produce income taxed as capital 
gain instead of ordinary income, and (2) create[s] a giant loophole that can be exploited via 
tax shelters.” Leonard E. Burman, Cutting Capital Gains Taxes is a Dead End, Not a Step on the 
Road to a Consumption Tax, Tax Pol’y Ctr.: TaxVox, March 3, 2015, http://www.taxpolicy-
center.org/taxvox/cutting-capital-gains-taxes-dead-end-not-step-road-consumption-tax.
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this theory is not true.24 The data indicate that the tax rate on capital gains is 
not a significant factor in stimulating economic growth,25 and trickle-down 
does not command mainstream support among economists.26 
For four decades the real inflation-adjusted before-tax income of the over-
whelming majority of American families has grown very slowly—the average 
annual growth rate of the first four quintiles was well below one percent27—
while only the top quartile has seen any significant increase in market-based 
income, and that increase is highly concentrated in the top one percent, with 
a growth rate of nearly four percent,28 and within that select group in the top 
one-tenth of one percent, and within that elite group, the income growth of 
the top one-hundredth of one percent outstripped by far the income growth 
of the rest of the top one-tenth of one percent.29 The result is ever increasing 
economic inequality. 
24 See also John W. Diamond & Pamela H. Moormau, Issues in Analyzing the Macroeconomic 
Effects of Tax Policy, 56 Nat’l Tax J. 447 (2003) (tax cuts shrink GDP if not offset by spend-
ing); Lizarazo, et al., supra note 10.
25 Joel Slemrod, The Truth About Taxes and Economic Growth, 46 Challenge 5 (2003); The 
Tax Break-Down: Preferential Rates on Capital Gains, supra note 18. 
Moreover, because by statutory definition, all property is a capital asset unless excluded, 
preferential rates are extended to gains with respect to some types of property that have no 
hope of stimulating economic growth, including collectibles such as (1) works of art, (2) rugs 
and antiques, (3) metals, gems, stamps and coins, and (4) even fine old wines. The need to 
expressly exclude every type of gain that is not within the favored category, rather than specifi-
cally listing those that are within the favored category, has led to additional complexity in the 
Code and tax administration. See Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Reinstating a Capital Gains Prefer-
ence and Tax Expenditure Analysis, 48 Tax Notes (TA) 1437 (Sept. 10, 1990).
26 See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Roaring Nineties 286 (2003); Lee A. Sheppard, 
Flat Tax and Politics at NYSBA, 70 Tax Notes (TA) 488 (Jan. 29, 1996) (recalling the 1980 
Presidential campaign, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, and the failure of supply-side 
economics to deliver the promised growth, Larry Summers referred to the claimed economic 
efficiencies of the flat tax as “deja voodoo economics”); Lizarazo, et al., supra note 10. 
27 See Cong. Budget Office, supra note 6.
28 See Cong. Budget Office, supra note 6; Piketty et al., A Tale of Two Countries, supra note 
10 (From 1980 to 2014, for example, none of the growth in per-adult national income went 
to the bottom 50%, while 32% went to the middle class (defined as adults between the median 
and the 90th percentile), 68% to the top ten percent, and 36% to the top one percent; share of 
national income earned by the bottom 50% collapsed from 20% in 1980 to 12.5% in 2014. 
Over the same period, the share of incomes going to the top one percent surged from 10.7% 
in 1980 to 20.2% in 2014.).
The after-tax, after-transfer income for a working-class household of three has only grown 
three percent since 1997. See Chuck Marr, Brandon DeBot & Emily Horton, How Tax Reform 
Can Raise Working-Class Incomes, Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities (Sept. 13, 2017). 
The after-tax, after-transfer income of the top one percent has grown about four times faster 
than it has for low- and middle-income households. See Cong. Budget Office, supra note 6. 
29 See Piketty et al., Distributional National Accounts, supra note 7; Edward D. Kleinbard, 
What’s a Government Good for? Fiscal Policy in an Age of Inequality (USC CLASS Research 
Papers Series No. CLASS18-2, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3118406; Thompson, supra note 19. 
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Likewise, when evaluating a major reduction in the corporate income tax, 
distributional effects must be taken into account. In this respect, I believe that 
the argument that the burden of the corporate income tax is largely shifted to 
labor in the form of lower wages (or consumers in the form of higher prices) 
rather than borne by shareholders or the owners of capital generally, does not 
hold water. Corporate income represents less than one-half of total U.S. busi-
ness income. Moreover, the stylized models that predict that the corporate 
tax is shifted to labor rely on a variety of unrealistic assumptions regarding 
international capital flows and international substitution of products.30 The 
better view is that the burden of the corporate income tax is largely borne by 
shareholders or by the owners of capital generally.31 Thus, a corporate tax cut 
benefits individuals at the top of the income pyramid, where the ownership of 
corporate stock and other income producing capital is highly concentrated.32
From this perspective, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, with its benefits dispro-
portionately focused on taxpayers at the top of the income pyramid,33 and 
providing special tax preferences for the owners of unincorporated businesses 
that are not available to wage earners is inconsistent with furthering both 
horizontal and vertical equity.
The dominant goal of tax reform should not be to improve efficiency to 
further enrich the already well-off, but rather to provide proper horizontal 
and vertical equity, and mitigate the economic inequality inevitably resulting 
from a laissez-faire free market economy.
IV.  Family Allowances, Standard Deduction, and Itemized Deductions
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act temporarily increased the credit for children 
under 17, added a much smaller credit for other dependent children, and 
eliminated personal exemptions, while roughly doubling the standard deduc-
tion, thus converting many itemizers into non-itemizers. These changes result 
in a tax cut for many families already claiming the standard deduction, but 
30 See Jane G. Gravelle, Cong. Research Serv., RL34229, Corporate Tax Reform: 
Issues for Congress (2017); Steven M. Rosenthal, Slashing Corporate Taxes: Foreign Investors 
Are Surprise Winners, 157 Tax Notes (TA) 559 (Oct. 23, 2017).
31 See Gravelle, supra note 30. 
32 See Edward N. Wolff, Household Wealth Trends in the United States, 1962 to 2016: Has 
Middle Class Wealth Recovered? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24085, 
2017) (almost half of all American households own some stock through direct purchases, 
mutual funds, ETFs or pensions, but the top ten percent of households now own 84% of all 
stocks). 
33 See Analysis of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Tax Policy Ctr., Dec. 22, 2017, http://www.
taxpolicycenter.org/feature/analysis-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act. 
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could increase the taxes for families who had been itemizing deductions.34 
Furthermore, the differing credit amounts for dependent children of different 
ages perpetuates different tax liabilities for family households who are identi-
cal in all respects other than the ages of the dependent children. Thus, this 
purported simplification conflicts with achieving greater equity.
In addition to increasing the standard deduction, the Tax Cuts and Jobs 
Act has eliminated or scaled back various itemized deductions. Thus, the role 
of itemized deductions and the standard deduction should be reconsidered. 
When the standard deduction was first introduced, it was a relatively small 
amount and really was principally a simplification measure, relieving tax-
payers with few itemized deduction expenses of the need to keep track of 
the amounts. Over the years before 2017, however, it had been increased in 
amount not so much for simplification purposes but to provide a low income 
allowance significantly in excess of the personal exemptions. After the Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act, the standard deduction, along with the child tax credits, 
which do not well correlate to the personal exemptions of prior law, now 
constitute the cost of subsistence allowance.  
I believe that having the standard deduction fulfil this dual purpose is 
a mistake.
However it is determined—by personal exemptions or credits—the amount 
of income that a household can receive tax-free as a cost of subsistence allow-
ance should always be determined directly, and only, with reference to the 
size of the household. Cost of subsistence allowances should be provided 
through adequate personal exemptions and credits, and the standard deduc-
tion should be abolished. If deductions that are now classified as itemized 
deductions are normatively proper or are justifiable tax expenditures, they 
should be treated no differently than those deductions allowed in computing 
adjusted gross income. 
It is true that the deductions historically classified as itemized deductions 
increase complexity, and scaling them back or eliminating them simplifies 
individual income taxation. However, it must be kept in mind that unneces-
sary or inappropriate simplification increases inequity. Thus, it is important 
to know whether a deduction is normatively proper or is a tax expenditure.
Some itemized deductions clearly are tax expenditures, while others clearly 
are normatively proper. For example, section 212 profit-seeking expenses 
and unreimbursed employee business expenses (including moving expenses), 
although historically classified as itemized deductions, are normatively proper 
deductions. They should be treated no differently than ordinary and neces-
sary business expenses. Thus, their elimination by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
34 See Elaine Maag & Julia B. Isaacs, Tax Policy Ctr., Impact of The Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act on Families with Young Children (2017), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/
publications/impact-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-families-young-children/full; Tax Policy Ctr., 
Updated Effects of the Tax Cuts And Jobs Act on Representative Families (2017), 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/updated-effects-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-represen-
tative-families/full. 
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violates traditional tax policy criteria, which dictate that all costs of earning 
income should be deductible. 35 
The same is true of personal casualty losses. Under the Haig-Simons defini-
tion of income, a deduction for personal casualty losses is normatively proper. 
Such losses always should be deductible, although a reasonable threshold 
limitation is warranted for the sake of simplicity. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
limitation of these losses to those incurred in presidentially declared disaster 
areas clearly violates the criteria of both horizontal and vertical equity because 
it fails to reflect ability to pay.
A.  Home Mortgage Interest Deduction
The home mortgage interest deduction is not normative. It clearly is a 
tax expenditure, and it is a poorly structured one. Studies indicate that the 
home mortgage interest deduction “is unlikely to influence the homeowner-
ship rate,” but does lead to over-consumption of owner-occupied housing 
by those who were already inclined to own homes.36 Furthermore, the home 
mortgage interest deduction likely results in home mortgage interest rates 
and the price of homes being higher than they otherwise would be, thereby 
shifting some of the benefit to home mortgage lenders, the owners of existing 
housing stock, and home builders,37 rather than making home ownership less 
costly for home buyers. 
In addition, to the extent inefficiency does not drive out inequity, the home 
mortgage interest deduction is an “upside down” subsidy. To the extent that 
the benefit of the home mortgage interest deduction is not captured by home 
35 Distributional impacts also must be kept in mind. While itemized deductions are of the 
most benefit dollar for dollar to taxpayers in higher income tax brackets, different itemized 
deductions are claimed principally by taxpayers in different marginal tax brackets. Thus, elimi-
nating or limiting itemized deductions to provide rate reduction principally to taxpayers in the 
highest tax brackets can result in tax decreases in the highest tax brackets and tax increases in 
lower tax brackets. The Tax Policy Center concluded that precisely this effect would result from 
the Republican Unified Framework for Fixing Our Broken Tax Code released in September. In 
2018, more than a third of taxpayers making between about $150,000 and $300,000 would 
pay more, in taxes, principally due to repeal of a number of itemized deductions. Tax Policy 
Ctr., A Preliminary Analysis of the Unified Framework (2017), http://www.taxpolicy-
center.org/publications/preliminary-analysis-unified-framework/full.
36 Edward L. Glaser & Jesse M. Shapiro, The Benefits of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduc-
tion, 17 Tax Pol’y & Econ. 37, 40, 76-80 (2003); see also William G. Gale, Jonathan Gru-
ber & Seth Stephens-Davidowitz, Encouraging Homeownership Through the Tax Code, 115 Tax 
Notes (TA) 1171, 1179 (2007) (the home mortgage interest deduction “has little if any posi-
tive effect on homeownership”).
37 See, e.g., Pamela J. Jackson, Cong. Research Serv., RL33025, Fundamental Tax 
Reform: Options for the Mortgage Interest Deduction 21 (2005) (if the home mort-
gage interest deduction were repealed, mortgage interest rates would fall in response to the 
lower demand for mortgage debt); Michelle J. White & Lawrence J. White, The Tax Subsidy to 
Owner-Occupied Housing: Who Benefits?, 3 J. Public Econs. 111-26 (1977) (the value of the 
mortgage interest deduction is capitalized into housing prices).
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sellers and lenders, the benefits of the deduction accrue primarily to upper 
income taxpayers, primarily the top one-quarter.38 
Nevertheless, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act preserved this least conceptually 
sound itemized deduction, although at least scaling it back. It would have 
been better tax policy to eliminate it entirely, albeit with a phase-out period.
B.  Medical Expenses, State and Local Taxes, and Charitable Contributions 
Some other major itemized deductions — medical expenses, state and 
local taxes, and charitable contributions—are more difficult to characterize 
as wholly tax expenditures, even though they are so classified by both the JCT 
and the OMB. To some extent or another, these deductions might be appro-
priate to achieve proper horizontal and vertical equity.
1.  Medical Expenses
Tax policy analysts differ in their views regarding whether medical expenses 
are an appropriate adjustment in determining a taxpayer’s ability to pay taxes. 
William Andrews concluded that medical expenses do not reflect a choice 
regarding consumption and a deduction thus properly reflects ability to pay.39 
Stanley Surrey, on the other hand, criticized the medical expense deduction as 
a poorly designed tax subsidy that was more valuable to high-bracket taxpay-
ers than to low bracket taxpayers.40 
I agree with Professor Andrews. Necessary medical expenses are a norma-
tive aspect of defining ability to pay, and they always should be allowed as a 
deduction. Of course, some line drawing is required regarding the meaning 
of “necessary medical expenses,” 41 and, perhaps, a minimal floor—well below 
the current floor—should apply. 
If a deduction for medical expenses is normative, then to properly measure 
ability to pay, individual costs for medical insurance also should be deductible 
by all taxpayers, not only by partners and the self-employed. In that case, then 
38 According to estimates by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, almost 75% 
of the benefit of the home mortgage interest deduction goes to taxpayers with incomes of 
$100,000 or more, and of that approximately 32% of the benefit goes to taxpayers with 
incomes of $200,000 or more. Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimates of 
Federal Tax Expenditures For Fiscal Years 2009-2013 at 54 tbl.3 (2010). Furthermore, 
when a tax expenditure is only partially capitalized, because demand at the highest tax brack-
ets for the item receiving the tax preference is insufficient to clear the market, higher income 
taxpayers receive a windfall. See Boris I. Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory: Do 
Misallocations Drive Out Inequities?, 16 San Diego L. Rev. 735, 744 (1979).
39 William Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 309, 
336 (1972) (“What distinguishes medical expenses . . . is a sense that large differences in their 
magnitude between people in otherwise similar circumstances are apt to reflect differences in 
need rather than choices among gratifications.”).
40 Stanley Surrey, Tax Incentives as Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison 
with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 705, 720 (1970). 
41 A starting point might be that the deduction should be limited to the types of medical 
care that would have been covered by Medicare. See Alan Feld, Abortion to Aging: Problems of 
Definition in the Medical Expense Deduction, 58 B.U. L. Rev. 165, 166 (1978).
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the exclusion for employer provided health insurance should not be treated as 
a tax expenditure. It is a tax expenditure only if all individuals are not allowed 
to deduct medical insurance costs in full. 
2.  State and Local Taxes
The deduction for non-business state and local taxes, which both the JCT 
and the OMB treat as a tax expenditure, historically has been the most com-
monly claimed itemized deduction.42 A 2016 CBO report described the 
deduction for state and local taxes as “a federal subsidy to state and local 
governments.”43 Long before the tax expenditure concept was developed, 
Richard Musgrave argued that the deduction for state and local taxes was 
not normatively justified. His theory was that state and local taxes are benefit 
taxes that provide goods and services to taxpayers equal in value to the taxes 
paid.44 
Other tax policy analysts, however, believe that the state and local tax 
deduction is normatively proper.45 They reason that the amount of state and 
local taxes paid by an individual does not correlate to the level of benefits 
received. Denying a federal income tax deduction for state and local taxes 
paid by the individual when those taxes exceed the benefits received results 
in over-taxation. 
To the extent this is true, because some states are higher tax states and other 
states are lower tax states, elimination of this deduction would violate both 
horizontal and vertical equity principles. The federal taxes imposed on two 
different taxpayers who were otherwise identically situated, except that one 
lives in a high tax state and the other in a low tax state, would not accurately 
reflect ability to pay. Under this rationale, there should be no distinction 
between state sales taxes and state income taxes. At the state level, both serve 
the same purpose.
42 See Zoe Sagalow, Most Prevalent Deduction Is for Taxes Paid, IRS Data Show, 157 Tax 
Notes (TA) 216, 216 (Oct. 9, 2017) (“Nearly 42.3 million returns included the taxes paid 
deduction in 2014, while more than 33.3 million included the interest paid deduction, accord-
ing to the data.”).
43 Cong. Budget Office, Revenues—Option 7: Limit the Deduction for State and Local 
Taxes, in Options for Reducing the Deficit: 2017 to 2026 at 140 (2016), https://www.
cbo.gov/publication/52142. 
44 Richard Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance: A Study in Public Economy 
(1959); Richard Musgrave & Peggy Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice 
345 (5th ed. 1989). 
45 Brookes Billman & Noel Cunningham, Nonbusiness State and Local Taxes: The Case for 
Deductibility, 28 Tax Notes (TA) 1107 (Sept. 2, 1985). Based on this theory, the President’s 
1985 tax proposals recommended complete elimination of the deduction for state and local 
taxes. However, the Tax Reform Act of 1986, much of which was based on the president’s 1985 
recommendations, repealed only the deduction for state and local sales taxes, and subsequent 
legislation restored the deduction for state and local sales taxes for itemizers who paid less in 
state and local income taxes that sales taxes.
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However, there may be a distinction between state level taxes and local 
level taxes, particularly real estate taxes on owner-occupied housing. The lat-
ter might be considered to be matched by benefits received, while the for-
mer fund general welfare. So, if any state and local taxes should be singled 
out for disallowance of a deduction, it should be real estate taxes on owner-
occupied housing.
I believe that state taxes are a normatively proper deduction that reflects 
ability to pay, rather than a subsidy, and the same might also be true of local 
real property taxes on owner occupied housing. The payment of these taxes is 
not voluntary and much of the benefit of local taxes, such as those that fund 
public schools and libraries, might be considered to be redistributive.
From this perspective, both such taxes should be fully deductible, and the 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act $10,000 limit on their deduction does not properly 
take into account ability to pay.
3.  Charitable Contributions
The charitable contribution deduction is almost universally regarded as a 
tax expenditure,46 although Paul McDaniel has advanced an interesting argu-
ment that the charitable contribution deduction for cash contributions, and 
for property in an amount limited to the donor’s basis, is not a tax expendi-
ture. He reasoned that the tax expenditure lies in the exclusion from gross 
income by the ultimate beneficiaries of the contribution—the individuals 
who are benefitted by the charitable organization’s activities.47 Under this 
view, the deduction is normatively justified in order to measure income cor-
rectly. But this position requires a narrow view of consumption. While many 
charitable contributions are redistributive, many charitable contributions go 
to organizations that provide, or have in the past provided, significant intan-
gible benefits to the donor.
If any of the itemized deductions warrant limitation, the charitable contri-
bution deduction, along with the home mortgage interest deduction, are the 
proper candidates. In light of my suggestion that the standard deduction be 
abolished and replaced by a more sophisticated system for allowing personal 
exemptions, the deduction for charitable contributions should be limited to 
an amount that exceeds a specified significant threshold percentage of the 
taxpayer’s income.
46 The report of the House Ways and Means Committee on the Revenue Act of 1938 
described the purpose of the deduction, first enacted in 1917, as follows: “The exemption 
from taxation of money or property devoted to charitable and other purposes is based upon the 
theory that the Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial 
bur-den which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public funds, and by 
the benefits resulting from the promotion of the general welfare.” H.R. Rep. No. 75-1860, at 
19 (1939), reprinted in 1939–1 (Part 2) C.B. 738, 742.
47 Paul R. McDaniel, The Charitable Contribution Deduction (Revisited), 59 SMU L. Rev. 
773 (2006).
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V.  Taxation of Business Income
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act provided significant rate cuts for both C cor-
porations and the owners of businesses conducted in a pass-through entity 
or a sole proprietorship, as well as significant changes to the tax base, some 
broadening the base and others narrowing the base—some rooted in sound 
tax policy, others not so much.
For quite a few years, tax policy analysts had reached a general consensus 
that the United States should reduce the statutory corporate tax rate,48 and 
there were a variety of proposals to reduce the statutory rate and simultane-
ously to clean up the base by curbing or eliminating tax expenditures.49 As 
Bill Gale, one of the nation’s leading fiscal economists has said, “Everything 
you want to do in tax reform starts with broadening the base.”50
The various tax preferences for businesses that narrow the base are the rea-
son why even though prior to 2018 the statutory U.S. corporate tax rate 
was the highest in the OECD, the Unites States has had an average effective 
corporate tax rate near the OECD average.51 
While it is good tax policy to reduce the statutory corporate tax rate and 
reform the base so as to bring the statutory rate and effective rate closer 
together, reducing the rate without appropriate base expansion is merely a tax 
cut. It is not tax reform. 
Changing the corporate tax rate and base has a ripple effect. The income 
of the majority of U.S. businesses is taxed directly to the businesses’ owners 
under section 1, rather than to corporations under section 11, and in the 
aggregate, partnerships and S corporations realize almost double the taxable 
48 See, e.g., Karen C. Burke, Is the Corporate Tax System “Broken”?, 28 Va. Tax Rev. 341 
(2008); Robert Carroll & Thomas Neubig, Ernst & Young, The Economic Benefits 
of Reducing the U.S. Corporate Income Tax Rate (2011).
49 See, e.g., Mark P. Keightley & Molly F. Sherlock, Cong. Research Serv., R42726, 
The Corporate Income Tax System: Overview and Options for Reform 23-25, 28-31 
(2014); Tax Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 1, 113th Cong. (2014); Staff of the Joint Commit-
tee on Taxation, Technical Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 2014: A Discussion 
Draft of the Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means to Reform the 
Internal Revenue Code: Title III—Business Tax Reform (2014); Exec. Office of the 
President & U.S. Dep’t of Treas., The President’s Framework for Business Tax Reform 
(2012); Kimberly A. Clausing, The Future of the Corporate Tax, 66 Tax L. Rev. 419 (2013); 
Jane G. Gravelle, Reducing Depreciation Allowances to Finance a Lower Corporate Tax Rate, 64 
Nat’l Tax J. 1039 (2011); Edward D. Kleinbard, The Lessons of Stateless Income, 65 Tax L. 
Rev. 99 (2011).
50 William Hoffman, Reduce Corporate Rates to Spur Economic Growth, TPC Panel Says, 2014 
Tax Notes Today 175-5 (Sept. 10, 2014) (quoting William Gale).
51 See Jane G. Gravelle, Cong. Research Serv., R41743, International Corporate 
Tax Rate Comparisons and Policy Implications (2014); see also Cong. Budget Office, 
International Comparisons of Corporate Income Tax Rates (2017) (comparing nomi-
nal and average effective corporate tax rates in G-20 countries). The Treasury Department 
determined that the average tax paid by U.S. corporations’ book earnings plus foreign divi-
dends generally was only 22%. See Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of the Treas., Aver-
age Effective Federal Corporate Tax Rates 2 tbl.1 (2016).
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income of C corporations.52 In light of the large and increasing percentage 
of business income realized by unincorporated businesses, either a simple tax 
cut for corporate income or corporate tax reform that involves broadening 
the base and reducing the rates could not thoughtfully be addressed without 
also reconsidering the taxation of unincorporated businesses. To reduce only 
the corporate tax rate would create a much more significant rate differential 
between the tax rate applicable to earnings retained by a C corporation com-
pared to earnings retained by a partnership or S corporation or reinvested in 
a sole proprietorship. Unless something were done to mitigate this disparity, 
it arguably could lead to inefficient economic decisions.53 
The solution chosen by Congress in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act is to pro-
vide a rate reduction—effected through a preferential deduction employing 
a complicated formula and replete with complicated definitions—for most 
business income taxed to individuals through pass-through entities and sole 
proprietorships.54
Providing a preferential rate for income earned through and withdrawn 
from pass-through business entities for personal use by the owners is a terrible 
idea from a tax policy perspective.55 
52 Mark P. Keightley, Cong. Research Serv., R43104, A Brief Overview of Business 
Types and Their Tax Treatment 2 (2013).
53 See Martin A. Sullivan, Relief for Passthrough Business Under Corporate Tax Reform, 147 Tax 
Notes (TA) 463 (Apr. 27, 2015). But see Amy S. Elliot, Economists Shed Light on Who Owns 
Partnerships, Average Tax Rate, 2015 Tax Notes Today 95-4 (May 18, 2015) (researchers have 
found that 61% of partnership income allocated to U.S. households accrues to the top one 
percent (those with about $375,000 or more in adjusted gross income); the average tax rate 
paid on business income by partners is 19.7%, which is lower than that of S corporations (at 
24.7%) and C corporations (at 37%), taking into account tax at the shareholder level).
On the other hand, the result might simply be a return to the pre-1986 situation when 
even small businesses frequently were conducted in the form of C corporations. See Bret Wells, 
Pass-Through Entity Taxation: A Tempest in a Teapot, 2 Hous. Bus. & Tax’n J. 1, 3-4 (2014) 
(“[L]owering corporate tax rates to 28% while maintaining the top individual rate at 39.6%, 
and maintaining a tax rate on capital gains and qualified dividends at 20%, should cause a 
broad cross-section of closely-held businesses to decide on their own to exit their pass-through 
entity structures and to opt for reincorporating their businesses back into C corporation 
form.”).
54 See William G. Gale & Aaron Krupkin, Tax Policy Ctr., Navigating the New Pass-
through Provisions: A Technical Explanation (2018), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/
publications/navigating-new-pass-through-provisions-technical-explanation/full.
The rationale for that treatment is “that the corporate tax functions essentially as a tax on 
capital income, and hence lower rates should logically apply to noncorporate net business 
income as well.” Karen C. Burke, Passthrough Entities: The Missing Element in Business Tax 
Reform, 40 Pepp. L. Rev. 1329, 1336 (2013). However, such a proposal does not necessarily 
comport with the rationale originally espoused for reducing the corporate tax rate, which was 
“the need to improve international competitiveness, not the desirability of reducing taxes on 
capital income generally.” Burke, supra.
55 Furthermore, section 199A is wholly unnecessary, because any unincorporated business 
could have availed itself of the 21% corporate tax rate simply by electing under the check-
the-box regulations, Regulation sections 301.7701-1 through 301.7701-3, to be taxed as a 
corporation, and S corporations could have revoked their elections.
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I will not examine the preferential rate for pass-through business income 
from a technical perspective here, but a number of commentators have already 
published analysis of the tax avoidance strategies that the new regime will 
encourage and enable.56 Furthermore, the Byzantine system of taxing pass-
through business income under the new law does not result in equivalent 
effective tax rates on the income of corporate and noncorporate businesses, 
whether retained in the business or distributed to the owners for personal use.
I firmly believe that the complexity of section 199A will turn out to be 
beyond the Pale. But it is not the complexity that troubles me the most.
Any regime providing a preferential rate for income earned through pass-
through businesses will not be fair when fairness is measured by horizontal 
and vertical equity. Under such a system, the owner of a business pays less 
in taxes than a wage earner with the same income, and very well might pay 
less in taxes than a wage earner with a lower income. That most pass-through 
income historically has been received by individuals in the higher ordinary 
income tax brackets57 assures that preferential rates for pass-through income 
disproportionately benefit those at the very top of the income pyramid.
Personal income should be taxed at the same rate whether it is realized 
in the form of wages or in the form of business profits,58 particularly if it 
is withdrawn from the business for consumption or for another investment 
unrelated to the business. 
From a perspective of traditional tax policy criteria, new section 199A is a 
colossal blunder. It is not equitable, simple, or efficient. 
56 E.g., Michael L. Schler, Reflections on the Pending Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, 157 Tax Notes 
(TA) 1731 (Dec. 18, 2017); David Kamin et al., The Games They Will Play: An Update on the 
Conference Committee Tax Bill (Dec. 18, 2017) (unpublished working paper), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=3089423. 
57 See Amy S. Elliot, Economists Shed Light on Who Owns Partnerships, Average Tax Rate, 
2015 Tax Notes Today 95-4 (May 18, 2015). Researchers have found that 61% of partner-
ship income allocated to U.S. households accrues to the top one percent (those with about 
$375,000 or more in adjusted gross income). In 2006, over 82% of net pass-through income 
was earned by taxpayers with an adjusted gross income (AGI) over $100,000 (23% of returns). 
And most of that amount was earned by very high-income taxpayers. Taxpayers with AGI 
over $250,000 (six percent of returns) received 62% of pass-through income, with 35% being 
earned by taxpayers with AGI of over $1 million. Mark P. Keightley, Cong. Research 
Serv., R42359, Who Earns Pass-Through Business Income? An Analysis of Individual 
Tax Return Data 2 (2012). Most pass-through entities are not “mom and pop” small busi-
nesses. See Martin A. Sullivan, Relief for Passthrough Business Under Corporate Tax Reform, 147 
Tax Notes (TA) 463 (Apr. 27, 2015).
58 In any event, trying to distinguish compensatory income from the return to capital invest-
ment is a fool’s errand. For most private businesses it is impossible to separate the return to 
labor from the remaining business profits. See Peter Diamond & Emmanuel Saez, The Case 
for a Progressive Tax: From Basic Research to Policy Recommendations, 25 J. Econ. Persp. 165, 
181 (2011).
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As I have proposed previously in an article in The Tax Lawyer,59 pass-through 
taxation should be abolished and replaced by a new regime under which all 
privately held businesses, whether organized as a corporation, partnership, 
limited liability company, or conducted as an unorganized sole proprietor-
ship, would be taxed at the entity level under a uniform rate schedule, regard-
less of the form of organization. Applying an entity level tax to all privately 
held businesses, however organized, would reduce distortions in the choice of 
business entity due solely to tax planning.
The tax base—the net calculation of gross income, business deductions, 
and credits—and the tax rate applied to earnings retained by businesses for 
expansion should be uniform regardless of the form of organization of the 
business and whether the business is publicly traded or privately held. Because 
all businesses would pay taxes at an identical single rate, section 1231 (along 
with sections 1245 and 1250) would be repealed.60
The only distinction between publicly traded business entities and busi-
ness entities that are not publicly traded is with respect to distributions. 
Distributions from publicly traded business entities would continue to be 
taxed as dividends.61 
Distributions from privately held businesses would be taxed under a dif-
ferent regime. 
This proposal originates from decades-long problems with the administra-
tion of Subchapter K and the incoherence of having three separate regimes—
Subchapter C, Subchapter K, and Subchapter S—apply to privately held 
businesses, depending on the form of organization and available elections. 
It is not a response to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, but it does offer a simpler, 
more equitable, and more efficient alternative to the pass-through provisions 
in that Act.
59 Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Rethinking Taxation of Privately Held Businesses, 69 Tax Law. 
345 (2015). 
60 There is nothing sacred about the “heads the taxpayer wins, tails the fisc loses” feature of 
section 1231. Prior to World War II, no depreciable property or land held for use in a trade 
or business was accorded capital gains treatment; ordinary gain or loss was the order of the 
day. See H.R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 372,415. Sec-
tion 1231 owes its origins to wartime exigencies. See Boris I. Bittker, Federal Taxation of 
Income, Estates and Gifts ¶ 54.1.1 (1981). Seventy years after the end of World War II, it 
is time we return to the pre-war regime for taxing such gains and losses.
61 Because the corporate tax rate has been reduced, then the preferential tax rate on divi-
dends and capital gains should be eliminated or at least increased to something higher than it 
is currently. See Rosanne Altshuler, Benjamin H. Harris & Eric Toder, Capital Income Taxation 
and Progressivity in a Global Economy, 30 Va. Tax Rev. 355 (2010) (taxing capital gains and 
dividends as ordinary income (subject to a maximum 28% rate on long-term capital gains) 
would finance a cut in the corporate tax rate from 35% to about 26%).  
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Despite its superficial elegance, Subchapter K is a failed regime.62 At first 
blush, the basic paradigm appears to be sensible in theory, but for many rea-
sons, in execution it does not work well. 
When Subchapter K was enacted in 1954, it was designed to deal with 
small businesses,63 with very simple profit sharing arrangements, and limited 
leverage. Currently, however, it is being employed by very large enterprises,64 
which often have extraordinarily complex profit sharing arrangements and 
significant leverage. Over the years, the simple provisions and general rules 
of Subchapter K as enacted in 1954 have metamorphosed into a maze of 
special transaction-specific and anti-abuse rules, which are supplemented by 
voluminous regulations.65
The basic premise of the section 704 safe harbor rules, which are at the core 
of the pass-through regime, is to compare annual allocations of partnership 
profits and losses among the partners with the change in the amount they 
would have received upon a hypothetical liquidation of the partnership from 
one year end to the next. But many modern profit and loss sharing allocations, 
62 See Lawrence Lokken, Taxation of Private Business Firms: Imagining a Future Without Sub-
chapter K, 4 Fla. Tax Rev. 429 (1999); see also Mark P. Gergen, The End of the Revolution in 
Partnership Tax?, 56 SMU L. Rev. 343 (2003); Andrea Monroe, Saving Subchapter K: Sub-
stance, Shattered Ceilings, and the Problem of Contributed Property, 74 Brook. L. Rev. 1381 
(2009); Andrea Monroe, Too Big to Fail: The Problem of Partnership Allocations, 30 Va. Tax 
Rev. 465 (2011); Andrea Monroe, Integrity in Taxation: Rethinking Partnership Tax, 64 Ala. L. 
Rev. 289 (2012); Philip L. Postlewaite, I Come to Bury Subchapter K, Not to Praise It, 54 Tax 
Law. 451 (2001).
63 See 100 Cong. Rec. 3,425 (1954) (statement of Rep. Reed of New York) (“[The partner-
ship provisions] . . . will be of great benefit to thousands of small businesses which traditionally 
operate in the partnership form.”); 100 Cong. Rec. 3,554 (1954) (statement of Rep. Knox 
of Michigan) (“Small businesses frequently operate in the form of a partnership . . . the easily 
workable methods outlined in the bill are important because many partners are taxpayers with 
small incomes.”); Internal Revenue Acts of the United States, The Revenue Act of 
1954 with Legislative Histories and Congressional Documents 1363, 1364 (Bernard 
D. Reams, ed., Hein Publishing Co. 1982) (remarks of Mr. F.N. Bard, of Barrington, Illinois, 
made before the House Ways & Means Committee’s Hearings on August 4, 1953, asking for 
a synchronization of tax treatment between the lower corporate tax rates and the tax rates for 
the “[eight] million businessmen” operating in unincorporated form); see also J. Paul Jackson, 
Mark H. Johnson, Stanley S. Surrey, Carolyn K. Tenen & William C. Warren, The Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954: Partnerships, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 1183 (1954).
64 See Matthew Knittel et al., Methodology to Identify Small Businesses and Their Owners (U.S. 
Dep’t of the Treas., Office of Tax Analysis, Technical Paper 4, 2011).
65 See Lawrence Lokken, As the World of Partnership Turns, 56 SMU L. Rev. 365, 367 (2003) 
(“The revolutionary accretion of detail in subchapter K is largely a response to aggressive uses 
of partnerships for tax avoidance, resembling a steady build-up in the arsenal of an army 
caught in an unwinnable guerilla war.”).
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often referred to as “targeted allocations,”66 cannot easily be analyzed under 
this method, because the partnership profit and loss sharing provisions are 
based on the premise that the partnership will continue beyond the current 
year and that the portion of the current year’s income to which one or more 
partners will be entitled (or loss the partner will suffer) depends on future 
years’ income and losses. These allocations must be evaluated under a vague 
standard based on consistency with a “partner’s interest in the partnership.”67
Other problems arise with respect to the rules under section 752 govern-
ing the inclusion of partnership level debt in partners’ outside bases and the 
determination of each partner’s share of partnership debt.68 The application 
of these rules, which are quite manipulable,69 provides the underpinning for 
the overwhelming majority of the tax shelters that have long plagued the tax 
system.70
In addition to facilitating the creation of artificial losses, the rules govern-
ing allocation of partnership-level debt among partners can be manipulated 
to permit a tax-free distribution of cash to a partner vastly disproportionate 
to that partner’s share of partnership profits. 
Subchapter K is deeply flawed and particularly prone to abuse. As stated 
by the court in Chemtech Royalty Associates, “many abusive tax-avoidance 
schemes are designed to exploit the Code’s partnership provisions.”71 
A radical change is necessary. 
Thus, I propose an entirely new regime for privately held businesses. 
Subchapter K and Subchapter S would be repealed entirely. The current 
corporate tax rules would apply only to publicly-traded corporations and 
their affiliates.
66 See, e.g., N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Tax Section, Report on Partnership Target Alloca-
tions (2010); Todd Golub, Target Allocations: The Swiss Army Knife of Drafting (Good for Most 
Situations—But Don’t Bet Your Life On It), Taxes, Mar. 2009, at 157; Terrence Cuff, Several 
Thoughts on Drafting Target Allocation Provisions, Taxes, Mar. 2009, at 171; Terrence Cuff, 
Working With Target Allocations—Idiot-Proof or Drafting for Idiots?, 35 Real Est. Tax’n 116 
(2008); Terrence Cuff, Working With Target Allocations—Drafting in Wonderland, 35 Real Est. 
Tax’n 162 (2008); Brian J. O’Connor & Steven R. Schneider, Capital Account Based Liquida-
tions: Gone With the Wind, or Here to Stay?, 102 J. Tax’n 21 (2005); Thomas C. Lenz, Using the 
Targeted Capital Account Approach to Allocate Income and Loss—Is it Better than the Traditional 
Layered Approach?, 5 J. Pass-Through Entities 25 (2002).
67 See, e.g., Bradley Borden, The Allure and Illusion of Partners’ Interest in the Partnership, 
79 Cinn. L. Rev. 1077 (2011); Sheldon I. Banoff, Identifying Partners’ Interests in Profits and 
Capital: Uncertainties, Opportunities and Traps, Taxes, Mar. 2007, at 197. 
68 Reg. § 1.752-1 to -4, -6 to -7. 
69 See Section 707 Regarding Disguised Sales, Generally, 79 Fed. Reg. 4826 (proposed Jan. 
30 2014) (proposing major changes to the regulations governing the allocation of partner-
ship debt among the partners for purposes of determining partners’ bases in their partnership 
interests).
70 Calvin H. Johnson, Better Twice Measured: Partner Basis from Partnership Debt, 147 Tax 
Notes (TA) 79, 81 (Apr. 6, 2015).
71 Chemtech Royalty Associates, LP v. United States, 766 F.3d 453 (5th Cir. 2014).
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Profits and losses of private business entities would not be passed through 
to the owners. 
Net operating losses would carryover at the entity level. 
Taxing all businesses at the entity level would greatly reduce tax planning 
and avoidance.72 Because income and losses would not be passed through to 
owners, and taxation of owners would turn solely on the receipt of distribu-
tions, the tax law no longer would be concerned about partnership alloca-
tions. The labyrinthine section 704 regulations would be consigned to the 
dust bin of history, with no comparable provision replacing them. Similarly, 
the continuing role, if any, of the complex section 465 at-risk rules and the 
section 469 passive activity loss rules would be very limited.
The entity-level tax would, in effect, be converted to a withholding tax 
by applying the imputation-credit model for corporate tax integration to all 
distributions.73 Each entity would maintain a “taxes paid account,” which 
would be applied to any distribution.74 Current distributions would be 
grossed up by the entity-level tax attributable to the distributed amount, and 
that grossed up amount would be subject to tax at the owners’ appropriate 
tax rates. A credit for the allocable entity-level tax would be allowed to the 
distributee owner. For taxable U.S. owners, the credit would be refundable. 
The taxes paid account would be reduced by the gross-up/credit amount for 
any distribution.
Privately held businesses could deduct all compensation to employee/own-
ers of the business, regardless of whether the owner is a shareholder, partner, 
LLC member, or sole proprietor.75 Because there would be only a single level 
72 See Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Beyond a GAAR: Retrofitting the Code to Rein in 21st Century 
Tax Shelters, 98 Tax Notes (TA) 1721, 1732 (Mar. 17, 2003) (“There is no important societal 
interest in being overly concerned with drawing a bright-line between ‘legitimate tax planning’ 
and impermissible tax avoidance. ‘Pure tax planning,’ apart from business planning, is not a 
goal to be valued by the legal system.”).
73 For the imputation-credit model, see ALI Federal Income Tax Project, Integration 
of the Individual and Corporate Income Taxes 50-52 (1993); George K. Yin, Corporate 
Tax Integration and the Search for the Pragmatic Ideal, 47 Tax L. Rev. 431, 436-49. (1992). 
For a dividend exclusion model, see U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Report on Integration 
of the Individual and Corporate Tax Systems: Taxing Business Income Once (1992).
74 The “taxes paid account” would resemble the starting point for the “excludable dividends 
account” in the Bush Administration’s proposal that would have permitted corporations to 
distribute nontaxable dividends to their shareholders to the extent that those dividends were 
paid out of income previously taxed by the United States at the corporate level. See U.S. Dep’t 
of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2004 Rev-
enue Proposals 13-14 (2003). 
The amount of the gross up would be based on the assumption that the entity had paid 
the statutory rate of tax, even if tax preferences reduced the effective rate. This in effect passes 
through the benefit of tax preferences, as long as there remains a balance in the actual “taxes 
paid” account. For the issue of passing through business income tax preferences, see Fed-
eral Income Tax Project: Integration of the Individual and Corporate Income Taxes 
58-90 (Am. Law Inst. 1993).
75 For sole proprietors, current Schedule C, with some modifications, would be converted 
into an entity tax return.
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of tax, current law limiting the deduction for compensation to employee/
shareholders to a “reasonable amount”76 would be repealed. 
Thus, the tax regime I am proposing is a single-level tax with a rate struc-
ture ultimately determined by the individual owners’ income, thereby reflect-
ing the individual progressive rate structure. 
Because the entity-level tax rate would be lower—likely significantly 
lower—than the tax rate of many individual owners, 77 there would be a great 
temptation to “shelter” in business entities earnings in excess of the needs of 
the business that could and would be invested in nonbusiness assets, such as 
publicly traded stock and securities.78 Accordingly, a vigorous accumulated 
earnings tax along the lines of current sections 531-537 would apply to all 
privately-held business entities.79 
The same considerations militate in favor of application of an analogue 
to the personal holding company tax in sections 541-547, which like the 
accumulated earnings tax would apply to all business entities regardless of the 
form of organization. 
A complete liquidation of an entity would result in gain and loss being 
recognized at the entity level with respect to property, with an entity-level tax 
76 I.R.C. § 162(a)(1); Reg. § 1.162-7, -8.
77 Currently, a very large percentage of pass-through business income is reported by rela-
tively high income taxpayers. See Mark P. Keightley, Cong. Research Serv., R42359, Who 
Earns Pass-Through Business Income? An Analysis of Individual Tax Return Data 
(2012). 
[O]ver 82% of net pass-through income is earned by taxpayers with an adjusted 
gross income (AGI) over $100,000, although these taxpayers account for just 23% 
of returns filed. A significant fraction of passthrough income is concentrated among 
upper-income earners. Taxpayers with AGI over $250,000, for example, receive 62% 
of pass-through income, but account for just over 6% of returns with pass-through 
income. A closer look at S corporations and partnerships shows passive income 
accounts for 10% and 25%, respectively, of their total income.
Keightley, supra, at Summary. Moreover, almost 60% is earned by taxpayers with AGI over 
$250,000, with 35% being earned by taxpayers with AGI of over $1 million. See also Amy S. 
Elliot, Economists Shed Light on Who Owns Partnerships, Average Tax Rate, 2015 Tax Notes 
Today 95-4 (May 18, 2015) (researchers have found that 61% of partnership income allo-
cated to U.S. households accrues to the top one percent (those with about $375,000 or more 
in adjusted gross income); the average tax rate paid on business income by partners is 19.7%, 
which is lower than that of S corporations (at 24.7%) and C corporations (at 37%, taking into 
account tax at the shareholder level)).
78 See Karen C. Burke, Passthrough Entities: The Missing Element in Business Tax Reform, 40 
Pepp. L. Rev. 1329, 1335-36 (2013) (“If corporate tax rates fall and individual tax rates rise, C 
corporations could again become attractive as tax shelters . . . . Permitting closely held corpora-
tions to benefit from reduced rates would greatly magnify the tax shelter problem.”).
79 Consideration should be given to subjecting all publicly traded financial interests held by 
a private firm to the accumulated earnings tax unless some threshold percentage of the entity’s 
assets, for example 80% or 90%, consists of publicly traded financial interests and cash.
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being imposed.80 Each owner’s amount realized would be grossed up by the 
owner’s proportionate share of the taxes paid account that had not previously 
been applied to prior distributions. After computing gain or loss realized and 
recognized on the liquidating distribution and the resulting owner-level tax, 
a refundable credit would be allowed to taxable U.S. persons.
Redemptions should be treated in much the same way as liquidations.81
No special rules would apply to sales of interests to a person other than the 
entity. There would be no gross-up or credit allowed to the seller.82 The enti-
ty’s taxes paid account would remain unchanged. The sale would be treated as 
the sale of a unitary asset; there would be no “look-through” akin to section 
751(a). Because privately held businesses would not be subject to a double tax 
regime, there should not be any preferential rates.83 The value of an interest 
in a privately held business frequently, and virtually always in the case of a 
small business in which the owners are significantly active (with the possible 
exception of passive rental businesses), largely reflects unrealized income from 
the efforts of the entrepreneur-owners.84
VI.  Conclusion
In conclusion, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act missed the mark in delivering a 
fair, simple, and efficient tax code. It was not true “tax reform” under tradi-
tional tax policy criteria. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act is yet another story of 
wrong turns and missed opportunities. And the plea for a fair, simple, and 
efficient tax code will continue to echo in years to come.
80 See Curtis J. Berger, W(h)ither Partnership Taxation?, 47 Tax L. Rev. 105, 153-58 (1991) 
(suggesting requiring recognition upon the distribution of property by partnerships); Andrea 
Monroe, Taxing Reality: Rethinking Partnership Distributions, 47 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 657 (2014) 
(suggesting that liquidating distributions by partnerships be a recognition event).
81 See Monroe, supra note 80 (suggesting that partnership liquidating distributions should be 
treated as taxable exchanges in which the partner receives cash or property from the partner-
ship in exchange for relinquishing her interest in the partnership and its underlying property).
82 This differs from the 2003 Treasury Department proposals, which would have permitted 
corporations to allocate throughout the year all or a portion of their excludable dividends 
account to increase their shareholders’ basis in their stock. See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 
General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2004 Revenue Proposals 
14 (2003). But even under the 2003 Treasury Department proposal, the basis increase would 
not have been automatic.
83 Cf. Rosanne Altshuler, Benjamin Harris & Eric Toder, Capital Income Taxation and Pro-
gressivity in a Global Economy, 30 Va. Tax Rev. 355 (2010) (the authors made a convincing 
case for that approach suggesting that if the corporate tax were integrated and set at a reason-
ably low rate, on both fairness and efficiency grounds the preferential rate on dividends and 
capital gains could be eliminated); Eric Toder & Alan Viard, Major Surgery Needed: A 
Call for Structural Reform of the U.S. Corporate Income Tax 26 (2014), http://www.
taxpolicycenter.org/publications/major-surgery-needed-call-structural-reform-us-corporate-
income-tax/full (suggesting replacement of corporate tax with a shareholder-level mark-to-
market tax at ordinary income rates).
84 See Peter Diamond & Emmanuel Saez, The Case for a Progressive Tax: From Basic Research 
to Policy Recommendations, 25 J. Econ. Persp. 165, 181 (2011); Calvin H. Johnson, Capitalize 
Costs of Software Development, 124 Tax Notes (TA) 603 (Aug. 10, 2009).
